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GEORGETOWN LAW TECHNOLOGY REVIEW

INTEGRATIVE INFORMATION PLATFORMS:
THE CASE OF ZERO-RATING
Olivier Sylvain*
CITE AS: 2 GEO. L. TECH. REV. 360 (2018)

Zero-rated services provide an on-ramp to networked resources
that are otherwise beyond many users’ reach. Through such services,
wireless service providers offer free access to a curated set of popular
applications on the public Internet. Its proponents assert that zero-rated
services provide an invaluable introduction to online applications and
content, which, in turn, will increase adoption rates in the most neglected
markets.
But zero-rating has split communications policymakers around the
world. Proponents argue that it grows adoption rates.1 Opponents argue
that it violates the network neutrality norms of nondiscrimination and
“innovation without permission.”2 Other opponents assert that zero-rating
dissuades governments from committing resources to alternative ways of
deploying affordable service universally.3 The issue has been challenging
for communications scholars to sort through, as it joins a variety of
arguably incompatible regulatory norms.4 I argue here, instead, that zerorating should only be evaluated in the way all communications
technologies are: how does it enable all members of the community to
contribute to and engage in public life on equal terms?

*

Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law.
Arturo J. Carrillo, Having Your Cake and Eating It Too? Zero-Rating, Net-Neutrality,
and International Law, 19 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 364, 424–25 (2016); Darrell M. West,
Digital Divide: Improving Internet Access in the Developing World Through Affordable
Services and Diverse Content, Ctr. for Tech. Innovation at Brookings, 10–11 (Feb. 2015)
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/West_Internet-Access.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4JDB-X2J7].
2
Barbara van Schewick, Network Neutrality and Quality of Service: What a
Nondiscrimination Rule Should Look Like, 67 STAN. L. REV. 1, 9, 30 (2015).
3
See Carolina Rossini & Taylor Moore, Exploring Zero-Rating Challenges: Views From
Five Countries, PUB. KNOWLEDGE (July 2015), https://www.publicknowledge.org/pressrelease/public-knowledge-publishes-net-neutrality-paper-investigating-zero-rating-p
[https://perma.cc/VG8A-GKT7].
4
See, e.g., Rob Frieden, The Mixed Blessing in Subsidized Internet Access, 15 COLO.
TECH. L.J. 269 (2017); Ellen P. Goodman, Zero-Rating Broadband Data: Equality and
Free Speech at the Network’s Other Edge, 15 COLO. TECH. L.J. 63 (2016).
1

2018

GEORGETOWN LAW TECHNOLOGY REVIEW

361

There are undoubtedly ways in which zero-rated services present a
cost-effective opportunity for communities who long to be online. But
there are reasons to be skeptical about their ability to actually achieve this
objective. I argue here that regulatory regimes, which permit zero-rating
are troubling to the extent that they fail to redress disparities in users’
engagement of the networked information economy.
The new attention to zero-rating creates an opportunity to revisit an
essential aspect of communications law that in recent years appears to
have been all but forgotten among policymakers and scholars. This essay
attempts to resuscitate the longstanding but often overlooked objective of
ensuring universal access to reasonably comparable communications
services. The idea is simple: the main purpose of communications policy
(in democracies, at least) is to ensure that all members of the polity have
the meaningful opportunity to engage in commerce and participate in
public life—that they have access to the full bazaar of resources on which
citizenship in the given community is based. The concept is not new. It
finds its earliest legal expression in the United States in the Postal Clause
of the Constitution,5 a provision to which Justice Joseph Story devoted
several sections of his opus on constitutional law. The post office, Justice
Story explains,
circulates intelligence of a commercial, political,
intellectual, and private nature, with incredible speed and
regularity. It thus administers, in a very high degree, to the
comfort, the interests, and the necessities of persons, in
every rank and station of life. It brings the most distant
places and persons, as it were, in contact with each other;
and thus softens the anxieties, increases the enjoyments,
and cheers the solitude of millions of hearts. It imparts a
new influence and impulse to private intercourse; and, by a
wider diffusion of knowledge, enables political rights and
duties to be performed with more uniformity and sound
judgment.6
This conception of communications policy has informed
telecommunications policy for over a century, even if its implementation
often redounded to monopoly service providers like AT&T.7 I have argued
5

U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 7 (Congress has the power “To establish Post Offices and
post Roads.”).
6
Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution 3 § 1120.
7
See TIM WU, MASTER SWITCH (2012); RICHARD JOHN, NETWORK NATION (2010);
PAUL STARR, THE CREATION OF THE MEDIA: POLITICAL ORIGINS OF MODERN
COMMUNICATIONS (2005).
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elsewhere that policymakers should reorient communications to promote
deontological interests in universality, equality, and social integration.8
This paper picks up where that last project only gestured in the context of
zero-rating. I propose here the foundations of a theoretical framework for
evaluating communications policy outside of its ability to increase rates of
new user adoption.
I. ZERO-RATING AS A REMEDY FOR ACCESS DISPARITIES
A. Disparities in Internet Use
The spread of wireless services around the world has helped to
close the divide between those with access to the Internet and those
without. But disparities in use persist largely because wireless service is
generally not as fast, reliable, or immersive as wired connections.9 In the
United States, for example, African-Americans and Latinos are equally as
likely to access the Internet as Caucasians; however, the general online
experiences between these groups are vastly different because the former
rely on wireless devices at three times the rate at which the latter do.10
Similar patterns of disparity characterize the nature of online engagement
between poor people and wealthier people on the one hand, and rural and
urban residents on the other.11
Such disparities are even more egregious around the world. Latin
America has an average of forty-three percent Internet penetration.12 Only
eighteen percent of the population of Sub-Saharan Africa has access to the
8

Olivier Sylvain, Network Equality, 67 HASTINGS L.J. 443 (2016).
See Philip M. Napoli & Jonathan A. Obar, The Emerging Mobile Internet Underclass: A
Critique of Mobile Internet Access, 30 INFO. SOC’Y: INT’L J. 323, 326 (2014); see also Eli
Noam, Let Them Eat Cellphones: Why Mobile Wireless Is No Solution for Broadband, 1
J. INFO. POL’Y 470 (2011).
10
Sylvain, supra note 8, at 464–69 (2016); see also Boris Bartikowski et al., The Type-ofInternet-Access Digital Divide and the Well-Being of Ethnic Minority and Majority
Consumers: A Multi-Country Investigation, 82 J. BUS. RES. 373, 374, https://ac.elscdn.com/S0148296317303260/1-s2.0-S0148296317303260-main.pdf
[https://perma.cc/XD89-58R4] (“Such type-of-internet-access differences are important
because smartphones, as compared to regular computers, are less suitable for engaging in
economic value creating online activities, such as brand- or price-comparisons, applying
for a job, or following an educational program.”).
11
Sylvain, supra note 8; Bartikowski et al., A Multi-Country Investigation, supra note 10.
12
Between Latin American states, however, there is significant variation: as of 2011,
only a few states had more than one-third of their population using information
communicative technologies, and even wealthy states had only 10 percent internet
penetration. See Tricia Gray et al., Gender and the Digital Divide in Latin America, 90
SOC. SCI. Q. 326, 329 (Mar. 2017).
9
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Internet.13 And India, despite having “the third-largest Internet user base in
the world,” has only ten percent Internet penetration, due to lack of access
in its rural areas.14 Even as Internet access rates increase globally, lack of
access remains a major issue.15
B. Redressing Disparity
Policymakers and scholars generally attribute disparities in online
use to unequal patterns of infrastructure investment and development.16
Governments accordingly commit public funds or create incentives to
reverse these inequalities. They have, among other things, directly
invested in physical fiber-optic and wireless networks. State and local
governments in the United States have supported the construction of
citywide broadband networks and facilities, some of which they own or
co-own and maintain in cooperation with commercial providers. National
governments, including that of the United States, have provided meanstested subsidies directly to qualifying “underserved” users and
communities.17 And, according to recent news reports, policymakers in the
United States are entertaining a massive billion-dollar investment in nextgeneration wireless networks.18
13

For example, while 48 percent of the populations of Kenya, Nigeria, and South Africa
have internet access, only 9 percent have access in Ethiopia, Malawi, and Tanzania. See
Fenohasina Maret & Daiki Akiyoshi, Turning Africa’s Digital Divide into Digital
Dividends, URB. INST. (May 9, 2017), https://www.urban.org/urban-wire/turning-africasdigital-divide-digital-dividends [https://perma.cc/ULZ8-U2S7].
14
Charu Malhotra, Bridging Digital Divide: Special Emphasis on Rural India, 55
PRODUCTIVITY 276, 278 (2014).
15
Broadband Commission for Sustainable Development, The State of Broadband:
Broadband Catalyzing Sustainable Development, INT’L TELECOMM. UNION, at 10–13
(Sept. 2017), https://www.itu.int/dms_pub/itu-s/opb/pol/S-POL-BROADBAND.18-2017PDF-E.pdf [https://perma.cc/9VEA-6EN2] (“In practice, it is virtually impossible to
experience the Internet effectively via a 2G connection. Only 76% of the world’s
population lives within access of a 3G signal, and only 43% of people have access to a
4G connection. Thus, the majority of the connected world remains under-connected, most
of them in developing countries.”).
16
See Philip M. Napoli & Jonathan A. Obar, The Emerging Mobile Internet Underclass:
A Critique of Mobile Internet Access, 30 INFO. SOC’Y J. 323, 326 (2014).
17
See, e.g., Federal Communications Commission, Lifeline Program for Low-Income
Consumers,
https://www.fcc.gov/general/lifeline-program-low-income-consumers
[https://perma.cc/E243-5EGW].
18
Katie Collins, Trump Team Mulls Nationalized 5G Network to Counter China, CNET
(Jan. 29, 2018, 7:30 AM), https://www.cnet.com/news/trump-officials-reportedlyconsider-nationalized-5g-network/ [https://perma.cc/2Y8A-HK55]; see also Press
Release, Chairman Pai Proposes Over $500 Million in Funding to Promote Rural
Broadband Deployment, FED. COMMC’N COMM’N
(Jan. 16, 2018),
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Government incentives for commercial investment also come in a
variety of forms. One prominent view is that providers and application
developers would invest more in infrastructure and new services if they
were freed from the burdens of government oversight and enforcement.19
Proponents of this view believe that a laissez-faire approach to network
management of residential broadband service, for example, would
encourage private investment in that sector. This is among the principle
reasons that Congress last year repealed Obama-era rules that imposed
privacy restrictions on residential broadband providers’ ability to, among
other things, collect and monetize subscribers’ web-browsing activity.20
It is also the reason that the Federal Communications Commission
(FCC) recently rescinded robust network neutrality regulations.21 The
debate over the past decade and a half about network neutrality takes up
the question of how federal communications regulation might best
promote investment in state-of-the-art broadband service: should
policymakers employ a “regulatory light touch” or should they forbid
providers from blocking or discriminating against unaffiliated content,
applications and services, or end-user devices. In any event, these rival
approaches in the network neutrality debate both posit that, whatever the
right policy approach, it ought to find the right mix of incentives to
encourage innovation and investment. I have elsewhere called this
prevailing approach among policymakers the “trickle-down theory of

https://transition.fcc.gov/Daily_Releases/Daily_Business/2018/db0116/DOC348723A1.pdf [https://perma.cc/J9PK-8G7N].
19
See, e.g., Diana Carew, Zero-Rating: Kick-Starting Internet Ecosystems in Developing
Countries, PROGRESSIVE POL’Y INST. (Mar. 2015), http://www.progressivepolicy.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/03/2015.03-Carew_Zero-Rating_Kick-Starting-InternetEcosystems-in-Developing-Countries.pdf [https://perma.cc/H9A6-VWPJ].
20
Brian Fung, Trump Has Signed Repeal of the FCC Privacy Rules. Here’s What
Happens Next., WASH. POST (Apr. 4, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/theswitch/wp/2017/04/04/trump-has-signed-repeal-of-the-fcc-privacy-rules-heres-whathappens-next [https://perma.cc/7WJ6-8Z44].
21
Restoring
Internet
Freedom,
FCC
17-166
(2018),
https://transition.fcc.gov/Daily_Releases/Daily_Business/2018/db0223/FCC-17166A1.pdf [https://perma.cc/VX5T-SU93]; see What Is Network Neutrality?, VOX (May
21,
2015,
5:07
PM),
https://www.vox.com/cards/network-neutrality
[https://perma.cc/6E8T-4LQU] (“Network neutrality is the idea that Internet service
providers (ISPs), including cable companies like Time Warner and wireless
providers like Sprint, should treat all Internet traffic equally. It says your ISP shouldn’t be
allowed to block or degrade access to certain websites or services, nor should it be
allowed to set aside a "fast lane" that allows content favored by the ISP to load more
quickly than the rest.”).
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innovation.” Under this view, potential users are the down-market “spillover” beneficiaries of private investment in applications and services.22
C. Enter Zero-Rating
Zero-rating is a species of broadband networked service through
which providers make a curated set of Internet-based applications or
programs available to subscribers for free. Generally, through zero-rating,
providers do not count participating subscribers’ use of certain
applications against subscription data caps. But, in practice, zero-rated
services come in different forms. A mobile service provider might give
users free access to a stand-alone application like Wikipedia Zero, the
crowd-sourced online encyclopedia. Or it might offer dozens of free
applications through one zero-rated service such as Free Basics,
Facebook’s zero-rated platform.23
These services vary in other ways as well. Some zero-rated
platforms, like Free Basics, impose technical standards that limit the
number of eligible applications that may feature among those offered.
Many zero-rated applications, moreover, are stripped down or limited
versions of what their developers make available on the public internet to
conventional paying subscribers. Others, like Wikipedia Zero, are standalone applications that make the “full Wikimedia experience” available to
users.24
Policymakers around the world often express enthusiasm about
zero-rating on the theory that, whether or not the applications are curated
22

Brett M. Frischmann, Infrastructure: The Social Value of Shared Resources 336–37
(2012).
23
Some observers include “sponsored data programs” among “zero-rated” services.
Through these, content providers and application developers pay mobile carriers to
provide users access to their services or content for free. See Where We’ve Launched,
INTERNET.ORG by FACEBOOK, https://info.internet.org/en/story/where-weve-launched
[https://perma.cc/GK7Q-UEXL]; see also Samantha Bates et al., Zero Rating & Internet
Adoption: The Role of Telcos, ISPs, & Technology Companies in Expanding Global
Internet Access, BERKMAN KLEIN CTR. FOR INTERNET & SOC’Y RES. PUBL’N (Jan. 2018),
https://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/33982356/2017-10_zerorating.pdf
[https://perma.cc/JF6F-YKS2].
24
Wikimedia recently ended its zero-rated service, Wikipedia Zero, due to continued
controversy and minimal use by its intended beneficiaries. See Cory Doctorow,
Wikipedia Discontinues its "Zero-Rating," Will Focus on Research-Driven Outreach,
BOINGBOING (Feb. 19, 2018, 7:37 AM), https://boingboing.net/2018/02/19/wikipediadiscontinues-its-z.html [https://perma.cc/XUU9-BYHP]. Instead, Wikimedia is seeking to
raise awareness and increase use of its services through community outreach. See
Zachary McCune, Raising Awareness for Wikipedia in Nigeria, WIKIMEDIA (Sept. 21,
2017),
https://blog.wikimedia.org/2017/09/21/nigeria-wikipedia-awareness/
[https://perma.cc/D7UA-ABKQ].
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or limited versions of those available on the public internet, simple access
creates opportunities that do not otherwise exist for education,
employment, and entrepreneurship. There is some merit to this claim.
Research has shown that with greater access, historically disadvantaged
communities are more likely to become active participants in the
economy. For example, internet users are generally more productive with
every incremental increase in broadband speed.25 As I have written
elsewhere, “even the smallest increases in broadband penetration rates are
strongly correlated with significant increases in the number of jobs and
aggregate household income in some areas.”26 This is to say that there is a
strong correlation between connection quality and a handful of important
macroeconomic considerations.27
The debate among entrepreneurs, policymakers, and scholars
around the world about regulatory regimes that permit zero-rated services
offers a fresh opportunity to reconsider what government regulation of
broadband network management ought to look like. How, if at all, should
regulators control the way in which providers and application developers
offer zero-rated services?
Many have welcomed zero-rating services, arguing that they are
cost-effective ways of introducing members of underserved communities
to the online experience.28 Investment in wired, land-based infrastructure
is notoriously expensive; its high fixed-costs of development make
providers and many governments tentative about investment. Traditional
land-based telecommunications service, moreover, tends to be heavily
regulated in most places around the world, largely because it encumbers
local public and private land and other assets. This acts as further
disincentive to private investment.
Policies that allow or encourage zero-rating services, proponents
argue, directly confront the incentive problem. Regulations that allow
25

MICHAEL MINGES, WORLD BANK, Background Paper: Exploring the Relationship
Between
Broadband
and
Economic
Growth
11
(Jan.
2015),
http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/391452529895999/WDR16-BP-Exploring-theRelationship-between-Broadband-and-Economic-Growth-Minges.pdf
[https://perma.cc/NTM5-DBKE].
26
Broadband’s Economic Impact in Michigan, CONNECT MICHIGAN (Mar. 2013),
http://www.connectmi.org/sites/default/files/connectednation/Michigan/files/mi_economic_impact_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/8AKY-4W6N].
27
Cf. Susan P. Crawford, The Internet and the Project of Communications Law, 55
UCLA L. REV. 359, 390 (2007); Richard S. Whitt & Stephen J. Schultze, The New
“Emergence Economics” of Innovation and Growth, and What It Means for
Communications Policy, 7 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 217, 263 (2009).
28
Mark Zuckerberg, Free Basics Protects Net Neutrality, TIMES OF INDIA (Dec. 28,
2015),
http://blogs.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/toi-edit-page/free-basics-protects-netneutrality/ [https://perma.cc/5658-4D7U].
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providers and application developers to experiment with zero-rating
services could trigger investment in network infrastructure for underserved
communities for at least two reasons. First, the anticipated increases in
online participation will create an incentive to invest in infrastructure to
support the service. Second, providers and application developers will be
more likely to offer zero-rated services and platforms on the knowledge
that they, as the first among their rivals to enter the market on zero-rating
terms, will effectively be the powerful gatekeepers (the proverbial “onramp”) to network services for new users. In this loss-leader position,
providers and developers will collect fees and other material benefits from
entrepreneurs who want to reach new users. They also will collect
valuable data about users. The latter is particularly tantalizing for
companies who have their sights on emerging markets in China, India, and
Brazil. Developers of online services today covet user data, the currency
of the networked information economy.
While there is great promise in zero-rating services in their
potential to bring users online, there are good reasons to be skeptical. If
allowed, zero-rated services give a significant competitive advantage to
powerful providers and application developers who are eager to expand
their reach and collect valuable user data. Regulators around the world
also might be concerned about the way in which the vertical integration of
transmission service with applications raises the threat of anticompetitive
behavior. They might also be worried about the ways in which internet
companies monetize user data in ancillary or secondary markets, with little
benefit to those users.29
Today, regulators generally turn to communications law, not
antitrust or consumer data protection, to evaluate zero-rated services.
Specifically, they assess whether the given zero-rated service is consistent
with network neutrality regulations that forbid providers from privileging
affiliated content or applications over others.30 The argument is that zerorating impedes innovation and free speech online by giving an advantage
to some content and applications irrespective of consumer demand—that
providers are effectively picking winners and losers not necessarily with
regard to user interest.31
29

Cf. Olivier Sylvain, Intermediary Design Duties, 50 CONN. L. REV. 203 (2018).
See, e.g., Telecom Regulatory Authority of India, TRAI releases Recommendations on
“Net
Neutrality”,
Press
Release
No.
100/2017
(Nov.
11,
2017),
http://trai.gov.in/sites/default/files/PR_No.100of2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/63T3-N9DC];
Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, FCC 15–24, 151–52 (Mar. 12, 2015).
31
A counterpoint is that these concerns are less relevant in competitive markets. Because
developing countries have highly competitive markets, one report writes, “[a]s long as
regulators mandate the publishing of operators’ traffic-management practices and ban
negative discrimination of non-zero-rated traffic, market mechanisms can be sufficient to
30
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Indeed, it is chiefly on these grounds that several regulators around
the world have forbidden the practice. In 2014, for example, the
Norwegian Communications Authority (Nkom) published an article
stating that zero-rating programs would constitute a clear violation of its
network neutrality guidelines.32 “[Z]ero-rating lead[s] to selected traffic
from the Internet service provider itself or affiliated providers being
favored above other traffic. And this is exactly the kind of situation net
neutrality aims to avoid.”33 The Norwegian parliament formally adopted
net neutrality provisions in 2017, substituting binding law for Nkom’s
voluntary agreement with stakeholders.34
Chile, for its part, added network neutrality provisions to its
General Telecommunications Law in 2010, and its communications
regulator, Subtel, officially outlawed zero-rating practices in 2014 for
violating these provisions.35 Despite a significant digital divide and the
popularity of “Free Social Media” mobile plans in Chile at the time, the
country’s commitment to net neutrality principles required consideration
of the potential long-term anticompetitive effects of such plans.36
In 2016, the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI)
published additional net neutrality rules that prohibited zero-rating
practices.37 This ruling was the culmination of months of conflict between
prevent the most egregious harms.” See Helani Galpaya, Zero-Rating in Emerging
Economies,
GLOBAL COMM’N ON INTERNET GOVERNANCE 1
(2017),
https://www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/documents/GCIG%20no.47_1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/WTD6-RA5H].
32
Frode Sørensen, Net Neutrality and Charging Models, NORWEGIAN COMM’N
AUTHORITY (Nov. 18, 2014), https://eng.nkom.no/topical-issues/news/net-neutrality-andcharging-models [https://perma.cc/U3LF-86K7].
33
Id.
34
Nkom also acknowledges the Norwegian adoption of Regulation 2015/2120, which
establishes European rules of net neutrality, but notes that the Regulation lacks clarity as
to its zero-rating policy. See Net Neutrality in Norway, NORWEGIAN COMM’N
AUTHORITY (Aug. 18, 2017), https://eng.nkom.no/technical/internet/net-neutrality/netneutrality-in-norway [https://perma.cc/6TZX-GY5G].
35
Lauren Walker, How Is Net Neutrality Working for the Countries that Have It?,
NEWSWEEK (Sept. 10, 2014), http://www.newsweek.com/how-net-neutrality-workingcountries-have-it-269632 [https://perma.cc/RN3N-PFWG].
36
See Daniel Lyons, In Chile, Net Neutrality Widens the Digital Divide, AEI (June 2,
2014, 6:00 AM), http://www.aei.org/publication/chile-net-neutrality-widens-digitaldivide/ [https://perma.cc/6MRK-ECPU]; see also David Meyer, In Chile, Mobile
Carriers Can No Longer Offer Free Twitter, Facebook or WhatsApp, GIGAOM (May 28,
2014, 3:28 AM), https://gigaom.com/2014/05/28/in-chile-mobile-carriers-can-no-longeroffer-free-twitter-facebook-and-whatsapp/ [https://perma.cc/KS8X-YYMH].
37
Ingrid Lunden, India Blocks Facebook’s Free Basics, Other Zero-Rated Mobile
Services
Over
Net
Neutrality,
TECHCRUNCH
(Feb.
8,
2016),
https://techcrunch.com/2016/02/08/india-blocks-facebook-freebasics-net-neutrality/
[https://perma.cc/UX3L-5EY7].
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the TRAI and zero-rating services, specifically Facebook’s Free Basics,
and immense public support for net neutrality.38 In late 2017, TRAI
published additional recommendations that would forbid data speed
throttling, leading the BBC to suggest that India may have the world’s
strongest net neutrality rules.39 The TRAI chairman explained, “The
overarching thought that we had was for a country like India, [is that the]
internet is an extremely important platform. . . . [I]t is important that this
platform be kept open and free and not cannibalized.”40
Regulators in the United States have vacillated on the question. In
2015, the FCC declined to categorically prohibit zero-rating practices in
its “Open Internet Order.”41 Acknowledging that such plans had the
potential to either benefit or harm consumers and competition, it elected to
assess these practices on a case-by-case basis,42 and the Commission
informed four internet providers that it would begin an investigation into
such practices.43 In 2016, Commission staff prepared a report44
establishing a framework for evaluating zero-rating plans.45 The report
found that two programs, one offered by AT&T and the other by Verizon,
“present significant risks to consumers and competition.”46 However, the
agency terminated its investigations under the new Republican
38

Id.
Prasanto K. Roy, India Net Neutrality Rules Could Be World's Strongest, BBC (Nov.
30,
2017),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-42162979
[https://perma.cc/YR92-MG66].
40
Ananya Bhattacharya, India Is Upholding an Open Internet as the US Moves to
Dismantle Net Neutrality, QUARTZ (Nov. 29, 2017), https://qz.com/1140558/netneutrality-indias-trai-is-upholding-an-open-internet-as-the-fcc-moves-to-dismantle-it-inthe-us/ [https://perma.cc/4UNC-7SQE].
41
Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, FCC 15-24, 151–52 (Mar. 12, 2015).
42
Id.
43
Klint Finley, The FCC OKs Streaming for Free—But Net Neutrality Will Pay, WIRED
(Feb. 3, 2017, 8:00 PM), https://www.wired.com/2017/02/fcc-oks-streaming-free-netneutrality-will-pay/ [https://perma.cc/Q5CG-8Y4S].
44
WIRELESS TELECOMM. BUREAU, POLICY REVIEW OF MOBILE BROADBAND OPERATORS’
SPONSORED DATA OFFERINGS FOR ZERO-RATED CONTENT AND SERVICES (Jan. 11, 2017),
https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-342987A1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3348-6W99].
45
Specifically, “[i]n addition to whether a particular zero rating plan is a vehicle for
discriminatory conduct, relevant considerations include the impact of data caps in
connection with a zero rating plan; whether consumers are given the ability to opt into or
out of a plan; and whether consumers are given sufficient information about a plan.” FED.
COMMC’N. COMM’N., LETTER FROM CHAIRMAN WHEELER TO SENATORS MARKEY,
FRANKEN, WYDEN, SANDERS, WARREN, BALDWIN AND BLUMENTHAL REGARDING THE
POTENTIAL NEGATIVE IMPACT OF ZERO-RATING SERVICES ON CONSUMERS AND
COMPETITION (Jan. 11, 2017), https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC342982A1.pdf [https://perma.cc/L7K6-M4EG].
46
Id.
39
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administration’s Chairman, Ajit Pai, who observed that “[t]hese free-data
plans [under investigation] have proven to be popular among consumers,
particularly low-income Americans, and have enhanced competition in the
wireless marketplace.”47 The FCC later reversed the net neutrality
guidelines that animated its zero-rating concerns with the implementation
of the “Restoring Internet Freedom Order.”48
II. TOWARDS INTEGRATIVE INFORMATION PLATFORMS
A. Beyond Adoption
The rival approaches in the contemporary policy debate about
network neutrality tend to abide by the same metrics that pervade so much
communications policymaking today—focusing on whether a given
intervention promotes user adoption, innovation, or investment in
infrastructure. But, while such approaches are useful, they only partially
account for the ways in which any given policy intervention ensures that
all people are benefiting from the wide range of online resources.
Consider an example from outside of the heartland of
communications policy: high-frequency trading (HFT). I described the
phenomenon elsewhere in the following way:
Highly leveraged HFT firms design computer programs to
execute high volume trades by the millisecond in order to
achieve the firms’ respective investment strategies. By
doing so, the firms expect to gain a quantifiable advantage
over competitors. The idea is that, even if any single trade
yields an infinitesimally small margin of profit, in the
aggregate, such efforts can prove profitable in even the
most stable sectors of the economy.49
On the one hand, regulators around the world have expressed
enthusiasm about HFT because it arguably introduces more efficiency and
liquidity to markets.50 Others, however, worry about arbitrage, market
manipulation, and general volatility.51
47
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A further critique of the phenomenon is more intuitive and
addresses the concern emphasized here: HFT is unfair to individual
investors who cannot afford the sophisticated computers and software that
enable such trades. That is, even if we assume that the craftiest or nimblest
companies should thrive in competitive markets, there is also something
glaringly unfair about a regulatory regime that makes it difficult for
ordinary, non-institutional investors to keep up with firms that can afford
HFT software.
It is that unfairness that I seek to elaborate on here, but in the
context of zero-rating. Proposals for laws that permit or encourage zerorating are unfair to the extent that they perpetuate structural inequalities
that prevail in public life generally. Over time, there is, to put the point in
slightly more concrete terms, a cumulative disadvantage in using inferior
networked services while others have access to state-of-the-art or even
conventional applications.52 To be sure, as a phenomenon, zero-rating is
different from HFT in a at least one notable way. The latter gives investors
with the wherewithal an advantage over those without it; it widens the gap
between those with the technology and those without. Zero-rating
services meanwhile do not accelerate subscribers’ connections to create a
competitive advantage over those who do not subscribe to such services.
Rather, they provide basic service where there was ostensibly none before,
narrowing but not erasing the disadvantage between those with highquality service already and those with just zero-rated service (never mind
for a moment those without any networked access). This suggests that
zero-rating may be useful in increasing adoption rates. But it also is very
weak medicine for redressing disparity. This is especially true if, as
studies suggest, the vast majority of users would prefer having a zero-rated
free plan valid for a short time or with a data cap, with no restriction on
the websites and applications that can be accessed.”53 Policymakers will
frequency-trading-affect-individual-investors-1408454495
[https://perma.cc/TTP8NY39].
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need to implement far more dramatic reforms if they are to ensure that all
users benefit from networked resources in ways that erase disadvantage.
B. Communications Law and the Infrastructure of Citizenship
Underlying my critique here is the assumption that
communications policy can and should be radically redistributive. This is
particularly true for a transformative general use technology like the
internet, which affords access to a wide range of resources. My claim
seizes on the insight, associated generally with republican speech theory,
that communications law defines the metes and bounds of the community
it regulates; it sets the terms by which people communicate and interact
with each other.
Communications law either engenders or diminishes members’
sense of inclusion.54 Shared or public communications infrastructure is the
foundation on which civic learning and social integration occur. This is
because communicative acts do more than convey discrete concepts or
articulate commercial transactions. They comprise the expressions and
language of contemporary public life.55 This is how communications
policy determines citizenship. It does so, not so much in the technical
ways by which immigration laws or naturalization processes do, but by
structuring people’s interaction with the cultural content of citizenship. In
this way, communication policymakers might also make integration far
harder for certain members of the community if networked
communications resources are unequally distributed.
The great promise of the internet at the time of its commercial
deployment over twenty years ago was that anyone with access could have
something to offer, no matter their socioeconomic status, geographic
location, or demographic characteristics. The Internet was thought to be
comprised of a “great and gathering conversation” in which every willing
user could join, free from offline biases or overbearing government
content regulation.56 But policies that permit zero-rating categorically
54
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violate this foundational concept insofar as they allow for the exclusion of
underserved populations from the wide range of content and services
online. They effectively perpetuate the uneven distribution of resources for
communication and learning. This is one way, then, that just as
communications policy might promote integration, it might also make it
difficult for members of historically subordinated groups to participate in
online activity in the same way that others can. The challenge for
policymakers is to strike the right balance in, on the one hand, promoting
expression but, just as importantly, encouraging opportunities for
inclusion.
By adopting the conception that I sketch in this essay,
policymakers would move away from thinking only about mechanisms
that support the distribution of basic zero-rated content and information
resources. Rather, the approach I propose posits that communications
policymakers should take as their priority the integration of all community
members into the full bazaar of information and content available online.
Metrics of sustained growth in engagement would be one way to measure
the success of a given communications policy intervention. But, more than
this, the concept I argue for here starts from the intuition that opportunities
for social integration are most robust when communications infrastructure
is freely available to everyone on equal terms.
C. Evaluating Integrative Information Platforms
The stakes could not be higher for members of historically
subordinated or underserved groups. For them, their inclination or ability
to participate in public life generally turns on the ways in which law
defines the terms of civic engagement or commercial participation. This
insight underscores the essential role communications policymaking plays
in shaping public life. But, as I suggest above, it is not new. It nevertheless
remains underdeveloped in ongoing debates about communications policy
in general and zero-rating in particular.57
Pursuant to the conception I advocate here, policymakers might
suspect that zero-rating is a good idea to the extent it promotes
(2006); ITHIEL DE SOLA POOL, TECHNOLOGIES OF FREEDOM (1983). Proponents of such a
view argued, for example, against government content censorship on the theory that it
would chill and corrupt authentic opportunities for innovation and speech. See Reno v.
American Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
57
We might suspect that, as I suggest above, this has something to do with the shift over
the past thirty to forty years towards the “data-driven” analyses in policymaking across
legislative fields today that the prevailing approach overemphasizes the quantifiable
consequences of broadband deployment at the expense of qualitative communication
values.
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applications that keep users apprised of political affairs. Or they might
require that zero-rating be applied to services that promote health and
wellbeing for underserved communities. But such approaches are far more
modest than they should be, at least because they discount the ways in
which community members might engage the full bazaar of networked
applications and services that facilitate learning, commerce, syncretic
cultural forms, civic engagement, and more inchoate opportunities for
social integration.58 Instead, the driving assumption should be that all
members have the potential to learn and contribute to the “great and
gathering conversation”—and that they can only do so when they are
engaged on reasonably comparable terms with all other members of the
community. So, apart from focusing on whether communications policy
increases adoption rates, policymakers could set their sights instead on the
question of whether and how zero-rating could enable its subscribers to
participate as fully in the public life of the community as all other users. It
is on this basis that I sketch here an alternative framework of evaluating
zero-rating services.
Even if we assume that zero-rated services bring new users online,
policymakers should still want to know the extent to which new
subscribers are integrated into the networked world. If, for example, users
can engage internet applications and services in ways that are reasonably
comparable to others, then zero-rating might very well help universalize
internet access. It would suggest a way forward for policymakers who,
through several public law mechanisms, could incentivize providers and
application developers to expand zero-rated services.
Many zero-rated services, however, offer nothing more than a
limited introductory online experience that does not take users beyond the
“on-ramp.” Indeed, it appears that many subscribers around the world
subscribe to zero-rated services as a temporary stopgap when, in any given
month or pay period, their usage exceeds data caps. 59 Users who already
have Internet access apparently often combine paid and zero-rated services
to suit their connectivity needs.60 Such usage patterns would not be a
58
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success under the framework I propose here. Indeed, we should be
skeptical of any service if it does not grow sustained interest among new
subscribers. It would not be enough that users from time to time subscribe
to zero-rated service.
Considering this, the alternative I propose here does not weigh a
network service’s success based on adoption rates. Instead, I propose
policymakers assess whether networked information services generate
sustainable growth in online engagement by unique users. Under the
approach I propose here, new users would invariably be afforded the same
or reasonably comparable access to the full bazaar of networked resources
on the internet as all other users. That is, they would be able to learn from,
interact with, and contribute to all networked resources in ways that all
retail internet users can. At a minimum, only under such conditions would
policymakers receive data or feedback on whether simple access to zerorated services justifies governmental support.
Providers, application developers, and new users have a lot to gain
from regulatory regimes that permit or promote zero-rating. But local
application developers, too, might benefit to the extent they can partner
with wireless providers or zero-rated platform developers. When deployed
in unserved or underserved communities, zero-rating might create
commercial opportunities for local entrepreneurs that did not exist before.
For example, the administrators of Free Basics, the Facebook platform for
zero-rated applications, could be particularly interested in cultivating
locally generated applications or content that reflect local, cultural
priorities and commercial opportunities. Of course, providers and
developers might choose to replicate the same suite of applications and
content around the world, irrespective of the local, cultural sensibilities in
which they offer their service. One could imagine that such an approach
would be more cost-effective insofar as the costs of scaling up or
replicating are far lower than the aggregated expense of production and
development for each community. On the other hand, national
policymakers might make the production of local content a condition of
providing the service. We should expect that, properly imposed, such a
condition would influence the character of online offerings and increase
local engagement of networked resources. And, in so doing,
communications policy would come far closer to achieving its core
democracy-enhancing objectives.
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